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ECQ1QMIC REALITY 
1. Introduction: the problem of the relation between economie science and 
reality, 
In the past decades a comprehensive discussion about the nature of economie 
science has started within the circle of economists, In this it is put 
forward that ameng other things current economie science, the so-called 
neoclassical economics (which is presented in most reference books for 
education as accumulated economie knowledge), almost completely leaves 
aside important social problems such as environmental pollution, the arms 
race, urbanization and the like, and therefore does not really contribute 
to the improvement of society, The instrumental and conceptual apparatus of 
the ' mainstream economics' is, according to the critics, unable to 
scientifically account for a society in which concentrations of power to an 
important extent influence the action of supply and demand. Economics from 
the reference books cannot deal with a world in which the gap between rich 
and poor, strong and weak, is increasing all the time, 
Especially on the part of radical Marxist economics, neoclassical 
economics is seen as a science serving to justify the existing relations of 
property and production. The neoclassical economists on their part reproach 
Marxist economics that their explanation of developments in the economie 
process relies on the philosophical presupposition of historical 
materialism, In the following we will not enter into de various reproaches 
of ideological prejudice, rather we want to occupy ourselves more 
specifically with the problems which in our opinion are hidden behind the 
political-ideological debate, Here we refer to the problems invalved with 
scientifical knowledge of reality, Attention is given to this in the above 
mentioned discussion about the nature and task of economie science, 
In this article these problems will be our subject, and our approach will 
be to inquire into the character of the abstractions in economie science. 
Following the introduction of this reader, we will distinguish a twofold 
perspective viz, the subjective and the objective perspective of knowing 
reality, 
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To be able to surpass the subjective perspective (compare the introduction 
to this readerj, a simplification of reality, as people' say, is necessary. 
The subjective perspective is limited because within this only a small part 
of reality is seen. Within the objective perspective, by way of a 
"helicopter view" much more is seen, but in a more global way. This 
simplification is reached by separating the relevant from the irrelevant 
with regard to a problem or a field of reality, and leaving aside the 
irrelevant. This representation immediately raises the question of what 
criterion is used for this distinction and on what grounds this judgement 
about a phenomenon being relevant or not is based. 
On the basis of this still general description of abstraction it is well 
imaginable 't nat the opinions about the criterion to be used may differ. It 
is in this difference of opinion that the relatIon. or connection of 
economie science with reality is under discussion. 
In order to be able to discuss this in an orderly way, a further 
distinction within the abstraction is helpful. The simplification of 
reality has various moments. 
1) In the first place economists distinguish relevant from irrelevant on 
the basis of what they consider economics. They cansider some phenomena to 
belang to their field of research, such as enterprises, government receipts 
and spendings, consumer expenditure, but other phenomena, such as . 
electricity, schizophrenia, grammar or biblical exegesis are left aside. 
This is not only a matter of division of labour between the various 
sciences which might as well have been different, but the field of research 
must possess a certain homogeneity to be able to explain. 
2) Another distinction between relevant and irrelevant is made with a 
view to universality of theories. We find this pursuit of universality in 
most sciences. Economists as scientists are not interested in for example 
the explanation of events in a specific enterprise which does not apply to 
any other enterprise. lor are they interested in an explanation of the 
price of gladioles at the Aalsmeer flower auction in March 1987 which does 
not say anything about price-making in general. All specific details, which 
do of course exist, are renounced. 
3) A third distinction between relevant and irrelevant is made with a 
view to the intersubjectivity of theories. A thëory should not be valid 
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only for a person or a certain group of persons, but in principle for 
everybody. If this principle is not foliowed, then we are back in the 
subjective perspective. In this perspective abstraction of all kinds of 
eleiaents such as renouncing personal preferences and interests of 
scientists is necessary. 
We now see that among economists there is a fight going on about the 
content of the distinctions between relevant and irrelevant which are made 
within the various moments of abstraction. What is called irrelevant by one 
person, could be considered of major importance by someone else. Thereby 
one must consider that in and from society there is not much understanding 
for endless discussions about the above mentioned distinction. People 
expect that there is a large extent of consensus in science about the 
structure of reality, and people get disappointed if this consensus does 
not appear to be there. In order to illustrate the fight about relevant vs. 
irrelevant, we will briefly explain three streams of thought which play a 
part in the discussion that we mentioned in the beginning, viz. 
neoclassical economics and the criticism on this by (neo)Marxist and 
(neo)institutionalist economics. 
This discussion will mainly deal with the various viewpoints on what is 
considered to be economically relevant to the different streams of thought 
and which phenomena and developments are not included in the analysis, 
low it is possible to classify the discussions among the followers of 
these streams of thought as a fight among paradigms and thus establish a 
connection with discussions in the philosopy of science. ¥e think, however, 
that another approach is possible. For one can associate each of the three 
streams of thought with a daily subjective experience formulated by a 
scientist. Anticipating further elaboration the three streams of thought 
can be connected with three experiences, viz. 
a. the neoclassical point of view in connection with the experience of 
scarcity and' the resulting necessity to make a choice; 
b. Marxist economics accounting for the phenomenon of exploitation as it 
manifests itself in a society with capitalist relations of production; 
c. institutionalist economics which focusses scientific analysis on the 
developments of power relations in industrialized and post-industrial 
societies. 
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2. Neoclassical economics 
In the circle of neoclassical economists it is common practice to- define 
economics, after Robbins, as the science which studies human behaviour as 
the relation between aims and scarce, alternatively applicable means, 1) 
This definitlon comprises the fact that people have classified their given 
aims or needs in order of urgency. Given that the means to satisfy these 
needs are scarce, but able to fulfill various needs, the subject logically 
necessarily has to choose how these means will be used, Therafore economics 
is also referred to as the science of selection acts, the 'logic of 
choice', a science dealing with all phenomena which are a consequence of 
scarcity and the resulting decisions. 
This 'logic of choice' holds true for a Robinson Crusoe as well as the 
central planning authority of a guided national economy, but also for 
people who can make decisions themselves and in doing so make use of mutual 
transactions of exchange. As neoclassical economics is especially 
interested in this last category, one can say without much exaggeration 
that traditional economics is the science of exchange, the science that 
studies the size and the varieties of flows of money and goods, 
A description of the selection acts does not involve a judgement about 
the nature and quality of the needs, This is even the explicit aim. 
Prosperity, as the extent to which needs are fulfilled, is a subjective 
notion, i.e, determining by the subjective feelings that everyone has in 
nis own way, Besides, prosperity is a formal concept, meaning that it 
includes everything that is considered to be included, This formal 
character makes it possible to set up theories mathematically and according 
to models. 
For drawing up theories, however, another datum is needed that is not 
found in the definition, How will people handle their scarce means? Even 
though they must necessarily make a choice, it is not certain whether they 
will apply the means carelessly and wastefully or with precision in order 
to take full advantage of them. If Robinson Crusoe is lazy, he may regret 
afterwards the time he slept away, but he may also consider his given aims 
carefully and with understanding. As long as a large variety of behaviour 
remains possible, no theory can be set up, or rather, just as many theories 
are possible. So another presupposition with regard to the behaviour is 
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required, This presupposition is not given in the definition of the abject 
because the content of the presupposition is not logically necessary, It is 
concomitant (be it indispensable) and as far as its position is concerned, 
comparable to the postulate of parallels in the row of axiomas in Euclidean 
geometry. Veil, the postulate that is employed by neoclassical economics 
with respect to behaviour, is that of rational action: 'economie subjects' 
will maximize <or optimalize) the realization of their aims, 
The 'mainstream economics' is therefore characterized by formalism. It 
makes use of a formal system of logical relations without there being a 
connection with reality, Characteristic to this methad then, is both the 
use of mathematics and the development of an axiomatic deductive analysis. 
The starting point of this formalism is the building of a model of a system 
by means of a collection of definitions and postulates. Hbw by means of 
certain rules this abstract model has to be connected to concepts having an 
empirie content. 
By way of illustration we take the example of the so-called production 
function, This function renders the connection between the means of 
production (labour and capital) and the final product that can be made with 
these means. The productian function sums up in what way a certain final 
product can be made. The entrepreneur must have knawledge of this function 
in order to be able to judge in what way he can make the final product. The 
entrepreneur will be especially interested in the changes in the final 
product if he is going to vary the means of production. Under certain 
suppositions one can differentiate this function and then the so-called 
marginal product arises. By camparing the value of this product with the 
costs the entrepreneur can make a rational decision. Another example is the 
derivative of the so-called utility function, that is, the mathematical 
relation between the amount and the utility of the goods concerned, The 
border utility, that is, the first derivative of the utility function is of 
importance in letting the cansumer decide rationally. In the context of the 
neo—class ical theory mathematic quantities as it were acquire in the 
abstract theory the smell of an empirie content. 
Fundamentally, the Standard economy is based on the assumption that the 
structure of reality can be understood ar at least be approached through 
the logic structure of calculus, of differential equations or of 
compilations. As an example of this Standard method let us take the theory 
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af the enterprise, On the basis of postulates the enterprise is described 
as a theoretical construction, a rational decision-maker who strives to 
maximize the expectèd net profits, whereby it is assumed that the 
entrepreneur has both the information and the capacity to realize this 
objective. 
Once the enterprise has been defined as such, 'lawlike' postulates can be 
derived. Thus it can be concluded that the entrepreneur keeps on producing 
until the marginal costs are equal to the marginal yields, These marginal 
quantities are the first derivatives of the total cost and the total profit 
functions respecively. When these two marginal quantities are equal, 
profits are maximal, c.q, losses are minimal. This is fixed in the nature 
of the model. Enterprising is reduced to an arithmetic method. 
Therefore, neoclassical economics does nat describe how entrepreneurs act 
in reality, for this acting is derived fram the logic of the model. It is 
clear that through a change in the ceteris paribus conditions any attack on 
the side af falsificationists can be parried. lot only can it be parried, 
but also the value of empirie testing can be denied. After all implicit in 
neoclassical economics is the conviction that the question of truth 
concerning the theory is imbedded in the logic of the theory itself. 
Neoclassical economics, of which we have outlined the main 
characteristics in a stylized way, never remained uncontradicted during its 
development. Within economie science itself its relation with reality has 
always been debated. To show what points can be at issue, we will discuss 
some criticisms in which certain social problems are taken seriously. 
3, Marxist economics 
Marxist criticism of neoclassical economics is still much alive. In the 
introduction it was pointed out that neoclassical economics a.o, cannot 
give an explanation for the developments in the relationship between poor 
and rich countries. Characteristic of the neoclassical outlook is the use 
af the expressian 'developing countries'. The poor countries have remained 
behind in development compared to the prosperous countries, but it must be 
possible, also by the application of western technologies, to reach the 
same level, In this outlook the observation that the difference between 
rich and poor countries is increasing instead of decreasing, despite all 
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foreign aid, can only be explained by introducing ad hoc factors which are 
nat given with the theoretical structure. In doing so the distinction 
between what is economically relevant and irrelevant is becoming doubtful, 
Exaggeratedly stated one comes to face with the choice that either the 
development problem is hardly an economie problem, ar that the distinction 
relevant-irrelevant has to be revised. The latter possibility is exactly 
what Marxist criticism means. This criticism is based on a different 
distinction of what has and what has not to be counted as economics, Here 
we will not go into the effect of theories about development problems, but 
will return to the Marxist system and on the basis of the phenomenon of 
exploitation we will discuss the nature of the abstractions in Marxist 
economics. 
Marx sees the miserable conditions in which the workers are living and 
wants to give an economie explanation for this. In economic-theoretical 
terms the explanation of the wage base is concerned in the framework of the 
distribution of incames. In doing so Marx is especially opposed to two 
opinions, The first apinion states that the economie system is such that in 
the longer term the price of labour will not exceed the barren minimal 
subsistence level, Apart fram temporary exceptions, workers will not 
receive more than necessary for the reproduction of themselves (from day to 
day, from generation to generation). This is considered a law pattern in 
the economie process and for this reason economie science in the last 
century has been called a 'dismal science'. However, accarding to the other 
opinion of John Stuart Mill, distribution of incomes is a matter of 
institutional modelling. The distribution of incomes can be changed by 
political decisions. Thus it is no longer only an economie problem. This 
opinion is still current now. In the economie process wages and profits 
come about; if we have an ethical objection to this outcome, if there is no 
acceptable distribution of wages, a redistribution can be realized by means 
of politics (worldwide: developmental aid). Marx opposes to both posltions, 
because therein the minimal wage is merely one of the results of the 
economie process. 
In his opinion, however, exploitation is the pre-eminent characteristic of 
the economie state of affairs and therefore an analysis has to start with 
this phenomenon. 
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In the introduction of the collection of assays (section 3.5.) it is 
stated that 'exploitation' implies a normative judgement, but also that 
with the concept can be referred to a quality of reality, Yet the normative 
seems to be a reduction of the objective of science, On the other hand it 
can be pleaded that only by virtue of normative insights can phenomena be 
noticed about which consequently the drawing up of a theory can be induced, 
stating why these phenomena occur. In this way, objective and subjective do 
not oppose eachother, but belong together. In classical economics the 
prosperity of the nation is the principle of the analysis, Marx chooses a 
different one. But although objective and subjective may not simply be 
placed opposite one another, they are nat on the other hand in a direct 
line with eachother. The concept 'exploitation' does refer to a 
characteristic in reality, but this characteristic nas thereby not yet been 
economically and theoretically described, so that exploitation can be 
explained. 
The step Marx takes from the subjective to the objective perspective, is 
that from the concept of exploitation to the concept of surplus value. This 
concept is determined by the description of the economie system as a system 
of capitalist relations of production. Characteristic of this system is, in 
the first place, that production takes place for the market (the system 
produces exchange values) and secondly that labour in the form of manpower 
also has an exchange value. The formation of surplus value is then 
explained as follows. The worker receives in exchange for his labour power 
the equal value in wages, i.e., as much as is necessary to reproduce his 
labour power. However, the application of this labour power in production 
by the capitalist yields more value than the wages he has to pay. The 
capitalist appropriates this surplus value by virtue of the employment 
relation the worker has with- him. In this way Marx shows that exploitation 
structurally belongs to the economie system. A politically and morally 
inspired redistribution ('higher wages and mare pension') does not solve 
anything in principal, it is the treatment of symptoms. Those who said that 
minimal wages necessarily are the result af the pracess, are right; but 
they do not see that it is the law of a structure. This does not say (and 
that is the core of the fight against capitalist relations) that this 
structure will always have to be there. The so-called economie laws of 
nature are laws appearing as capitalist laws. 
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So Marxist criticism af (neo)classical economics starts with criticism of 
the distinction of relevant and irrelevant within the economie point of 
view. It is a fight about the quëstion of how the central problem of the 
economy is to be defined, leoclassical economics is the science of the 
society of exchange. (leo)Marxist economics is the science of the 
development of capitalist relations, Differences of opinion about this have 
had far-reaching consequences far the development of theories, The 
explanations of such phenomena as money and credit, international trade, 
market trends and crises, are becoming coloured by them. In many cases 
Marxist explanations exclude (neo)classical explanations. 
In the first mentioned moment of abstraction, electricity and grammar were 
mentioned as examples of phenomena irrelevant to economists. There will be 
no difference of opinion about this. However, we have seen now that there 
are also phenomena, such as the distribution of income, of which it is not 
clear to everyone in the same way whether they are econamically relevant, 
and if so, how. Can a difference of opinion about this be settled 
methodically? 
Marx made some well-known predictions about the further development of 
capitalism. The general rate of profit would decrease, the Verelendung of 
the proletariat would increase, a concentration of power within the 
capitalist class would occur. Generally speaking people hold the view that 
these predictions have not come true. Is that a reason to decide that Marx' 
principle is unsound? Certainly not to Marxists. They rather conclude that 
the theory about capitalism can still be improved, without giving up the 
principle. They also have every right to do so, because neoclassical 
economics does not exactly have a splendid service of records as far as 
correctness of predictions is concerned, 
Criticism of logica! consistency seems to be more serious. To be able to 
explain exploitation c.q. the surplus value, Marx uses the theory of labour 
value. This implies that goods do not only have a price in money, but also 
an (economie) value in terms of working hours spent in their production. At 
a certain moment in nis analysis he is faced with a transformation problem: 
the conversion of labour value in prices. The way Marx executes this 
conversion, however, is inconsistent, because in doing so he has to use 
prices, whereas this very conversion should explain the prices. About this 
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question an extensive and rather technical discussion has been carried on 
in the literature. 2) What is discussed there, can also be said in 
philosophic language. Marx adopted dialectics farm Hegel and with this 
method he analyzes the economie process, The criticism of his analysis is 
now that with this method he does try to tracé the price of exchange as a 
phenomenon back to the labour value, as its nature, but with the same 
method does not succeed in indicating why the nature has precisely this 
manifestation and not another one. Therefore, the necessary connection 
between the two is not yet certain, This criticism of the censistency has 
serious consequences. The way in which Marx describes exploitation as a 
q_uality of economie reaiity is so closely connected with his method that 
criticism of this method is also criticism of this description. 
In this way objections can be raised against Marx' point of departure. 
But must one on the basis of these objections decide to enthrone the neo-
classical doctrine as the only legitimate explanation? In the discussion 
already mentioned it has become quite clear that one can also have serious 
logical objections to the neo-classical theory. 3) We do not intend to work 
out these problems any further. What we want to put forward here, is that 
in the difference between neoclassical and Marxist economics, evidently no 
fixed or objective point can be found to choose between the two. 
4. Institutionalist economics. 
In neoclassical thinking Robbins' definition determines the distinction 
between relevant and irrelevant phenomena, Summarized briefly neoclassical 
economics is concerned with an explanation of the phenomenon of the 
allocation of scarce resources. This allocation is an exchange between 
individuals and their given supplies of resources, thereby increasing the 
use, that is the satisfaction of needs that can be derived fram these 
supplies. With the help of mathematical equations the allocation can be 
formulated and so the subject can calculate his maximum or mimimum. It is 
not denied by (neo)institutionalists that allocation of scarce resources is 
an interesting phenomenon to economists, but in their opinion the entire 
field of studies is much more embracing, In practice the allocation problem 
is solved institutionally rather than logically. The institutional side is 
the real problem. In the words of one of the institutionalists: "Efficiënt 
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use of scarce means is not so much the problem as is something else: 
forming a concensus regarding what we want to do and implementing 
institutional changes which are required by this consensus." 4) 
To a neoclassical economist this statement would be difficult to 
understand; 'what we want to do' is no more than anyone else wants, for 
everyone is free to set up his goals. In as far as this requires the scarce 
means of others, a consensus must indeed be found but that is no more than 
agreeing with sameone about the price in an exchange transaction. It is not 
really clear to the neo-classic in what respect institutional changes are 
needed here. Institutions are a given fact in respect of the allocation 
problem. Thereby one considers in the first place the non-economic 
institutions, for instance to be summarized as 'the political and legal 
organization of the social environment', 5) Mext the market could also be 
called an institution as the place the allocation occurs and this too is a 
given fact, for the allocation problem with which neoclassical economics 
occupies itself, can be reformulated as follows: how is it possible that a 
decentralized, individualistic system, working on the basis of self-
interest, has a coordinated outcome (whereby this outcome has in advance 
been defined as balance). 
If the institutionalist wants to criticize this, then that is the result 
of an experience of reality. Just as for Marx exploitation was the 
experience of a phenomenon which he thought could not be ignored by 
economie science, so is it an experience for the institutionalist that in 
present reality there is no individualistic system, but that for instance 
large enterprises leave their marks on the course of the economie process 
and its developments leave their marks on 'the political and legal 
organization of the social environment' . By virtue of its determination of 
object, neoclassical economics can only place economie power as power on 
the market. Economie power is working itself out in supply and demand on 
the market and manifests itself as influence on the price and quantity. 
Outside the system of supply and demand neoclassical economics does not 
know what to do with economie power. But the experience of economie power 
is broader. It also comprises the influence on political decisions and on 
the formation of preferences and values. Economie science must explain this 
as well. The parallel with Marx can be continued. We saw that Marx not only 
opposes positioning exploitation in the non-economic sphere, but also the 
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analysis of exploitation as an inevitable result of the economie process. 
The point is that on the basis of the economie explanation a strategy can 
be formulated to fight against exploitation. A similar attitude is found 
among the institutianalists. Economie science explains developments and has 
to formulate strategies to solve social problems, such as for instance 
underdevelopment and environmental pollution, by means of institutional 
changes. 6) 
How is it that this subjective experience of economie power is given 
conceptual form in the objective perspective? If institutions are subject 
to change, the economie analysis should not begin with a presupposition 
with regard to institutions, but the description should be such that very 
different institutional designs are possible. The following is such a 
description: lhe_economy (in the sense of a field of life) is the social 
organization of the culturally determined whole of regulations concerning 
the relation between man and nature. In other words, the abject of 
economie science consists of all the human relations wherein the material 
relations of men and nature are institutionalized. These material relations 
and the human relations connected to them are the way in which a group 
makes a living and is able to survive. The exchange economy, with which 
neoclassical economics in fact occupies itself, is but one of the possible 
institutional designs. The institutionalists do not deny that such an 
exchange economy can exist, or more than that, has existed and that 
neoclassical economics has been of current interest for a long time. But 
this topicality has been lost, because the exchange economy has been 
invalved in a process of constant change. 
We see that the idea of the economie process being organized forms the 
key to the analysis of this process, much as for Marx the key was 
exploitation. In order to see how far-reaching are the consequences of the 
formation of a theory and methodology, we will look into the extent to 
which the Marxist and neoclassical approaches are excluded by 
institutionalism. 
5. Comparative analysis 
a. With respect to Harxism it can be noted that therein an extraordinarily 
dominant importance is ascribed to the institution of private property. 
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With the help of private property of capital (goods) the process of 
exploitation is explained. Apart from this no more is needed than a 
capitalist striving for maximal profit, fuil competition among capitalists 
and a labour market. For the institutionalists this is too limited. What is 
the meaning of Marxist the.ory in a world in which for instance the 
dominating institution is the 'giant Corporation', led by managers instead 
of by the shareholders-owners in which the latter generally speaking obtain 
merely a limited dividend, Marxism has not changed the institutional 
framework which is also assumed in classical economics, but only attached 
different consequences to it. Therefore Marxism does not have a real 
institutionalist approach, 
But could it then be said that institutionalism is more general than 
Marxism, because institutionalists make room for the possibility of the 
social development of private property, which Marx speaks of? An 
affirmative answer implies that in principle the theory of Marxism is 
accepted, be it with a limited validity, This is not the case, however. The 
theory of labour value, essential for Marx's explanation of surplus value, 
is not adopted. This is significant, for it implies that institutions 
according to institutionalists function in a different manner than with 
Marx. The institutionalists are more on a line with the neo-classical 
theory of values, when they describe value very generally (thus not only 
economically) as a judgement by an individual or an institution as to what 
is desirable or highly appreciated. Institutions and organisations have 
more or less power in society and can in this way try to assert their value 
judgements. The image of the 19th century Western economies shows that 
those possessing capital have great power because capital used to be the 
most scarce production factor. The value judgements of the capitalists 
determine to a great extent the social concensus. This concerns not only 
the relations with the workers, but just as much what will be produced. For 
Marx, however, institutions are only interesting from the viewpoint of the 
influence on the relation of the worker with his product. For the 
institutionalists this viewpoint does not really exist; for them, all that 
matters is that social changes are accompanied by as few problems as 
possible (with respect to value judgements). The difference between the two 
approaches is seen most clearly in the fact that for Marx, capital is a 
social relation, whereas the institutionalists refer to capital as a 
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production factor, thus as a thing, and restrict the institutional to thé 
behaviour of capitalists and their organizations. It is indeed clear that 
without a substantiai impairment of the Marxist conceptual apparatus no 
translation is possible of Marxist into institutional economics, 
b, During the past ten years several attempts have been made in 
neoclassical economics to involve the explanation of the institutions in 
the formation of theories and to no longer leave it aside as being 
irrelevant to the field of research. On this point it can become clear 
whether the institutionalist approach has indeed its own character, or 
whether it could be reconciled with neoclassical economics, Vithin 
neoclassical economics there are two methods to be distinguished in this 
respect, 7) The first method is that of the so-called game theory, In this 
theory it is accepted that individuals have different strategie 
possibilities to act, their acting is not the determined result of a 
consideration of value. These strategie possibilities are present in 
situations in which the individual actions could provoke reactions by 
others which have a substantiai influence on the situation of the one 
considering an action (situations which therefore differ from the situation 
of full competition). One of the best known examples af this is the 
prisoner's dilemma, The institutional element is now that conflict or co-
operation should be calculated as part of the solution of the game, It 
would be going too far to give a detailed elaboration here, but we can 
state briefly one of the most important institutionalist points of 
criticism. 
The game theory shows that actors in the field of strategie 
possibilities can be mistaken in their choice of action. By that is meant 
that for example in the prisoner's dilemma the actors can rationally make a 
choice that will not lead to an optimum, It is crucial that this mistake is 
defined with respect to the optimum, For the optimum is nothing more than 
what the neoclassical theory already defined as the result of the process 
of exchange, without including institutions. In other words, the 
institutions are strictly speaking merely complications. The science which 
includes these complications in the modelling analysis does not arrive at a 
substantiaily different approach of the phenomena of the modern society of 
exchange. 
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The second way in neoclassical ecanomics to invalve the formation and 
change of institutions in the explanation of the theory, is the following: 
Institutions belong to the delimitations within which an individual 
maximalizes his result, But it does involve a time aspect. The fact of 
being given and thereby the delimiting quality only holds true for the 
short term. Eventually all that can be changed will in fact change as a 
result of individual maximiziTig decisions. If the period of time taken in 
the analysis is long enough, an economie explanation can be given of for 
instance, the transition from feudalism to capitalism or of the rise of the 
limited liability company. 
Against this the institutionalists bring up among other things criticism 
of inconsistency. On the one hand it is attempted to change all variables 
that where initially explaining (therefore exogenous) into variables that 
need to be explained, on the other hand, the maximizing behaviour, which by 
definition is only thinkable with given (exogenous) limitations is 
maintained for the definitive explanation. The criticism could be put in 
still another way, viz. that people keep on thinking that functioning 
markets remain in existance. Here again institutions are no more than 
incidental complications. The institutionalist approach does not go along 
with this and as a result the maximizing problem is rejected as 
characterization of the economie problem, 
c. Is institutionalism now in a better position than neoclassical 
ecanomics? Much emphasis is put on the economy as an open system, in 
constant interaction with the surroundings, that is to say that the economy 
is a subsystem, a part of the embracing social system. As a result of the 
interactions the parts of the system among themselves and with the whole, 
the institutionalists do not have explanatory exogenous variables at their 
disposal either. 
For a long time it has been a weakness of institutionalism that the 
methodology remained vague compared to that of neoclassical economics. 
Recently an attempt was made to formulate the institutionalist methodology 
more accurately by characterizing explanation as the formation of a 
'pattern model'• 8) In short it boils down to the following. By means of 
participating observation it is tried to find returning themes in a certain 
society, such as accepted practices, standards, production methods and 
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recognized social goals. These themes emphasize and clarify both the total 
character and the individuality of the investigated system. These themes 
are eventually interwoven into a network or pattern, forming the 'pattern 
model', Such a model has to be continually revised, because new data become 
available en because the system itself evolves. The aim of the model . 
forming is not to be able to make predictions, but to understand reality. 
This method raises many more questions concerning the possibility af 
testing the patterns. It also has a strongly inductivist streak and the 
question is whether the attention for the uniqueness of each system on the 
one hand can permanently go together with on the other hand the effort to 
develop from various patterns concepts which are the elements of a 'cross-
cultural economics'. 9) 
6. Conclusion 
At the end of section 1 we mentioned the term paradigm, The short 
discussion of neoclassical, Marxist and institutionalist economics can 
easily be understood as the description of three paradigms, all the more 
because they evidently exclude one another in character. The analyses in 
the philosophy of science concerning paradigms has led to the conclusion 
that no rationality by wich a choice among paradigms can be made is 
constantly available. As far as economie science is concerned, however, we 
do not want to confine ourselves to this conclusion. 
Concepts such as paradigms, research programs and the like have been 
developed as a result of scientific-philosophical and scientific-historical 
research of natural sciences. We do not deny that these concepts can also 
be useful in a reflection on economie science. levertheless it is notable 
that the situation in economics is different. 
Marxist economics, for example, has arisen as a result of a major social 
problem, of which few .(also non-Marxists) will deny that it has at the 
least an economie aspect, However, one can only speak of a difference in 
paradigm if one group of economists thinks that something has to change in 
the economie process itself to solve this social problem, while the other 
group thinks that factors outside the economie process are decisive for the 
solution. Both the view that the problem has an economie cause, and the 
wish to solve this problem, together result in a specific conceptualisation 
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of what is intuitively understood by economics, The situation in economics 
can be typified more generally by using an image from the introduction of 
this reader in a different way. By means of scientific research and 
development of theories we try to discover where the paths lie in the park 
of economics. In this image it goes without saying that we can only enter 
the park through a specific entrance. These entrances are different: in 
classical economics it is the inquiry into prosperity of the nation, for 
Marx it is the inquiry into the abolition of exploitation, for neoclassics 
it is the inquiry into the optimal adaptation of the individual to the 
world, for institutionalists it is the inquiry into the change of 
institutions. The odd thing is now that research begun at different 
entrances, provides different maps of the paths; sometimes this goes on so 
far that there seem to be different parks. For, we saw that a synthesis 
between different streams of thought is highly problematic. 
But why is this so strange? Because by our intuition it is not necessary 
that different approaches should have to exclude one another, The practical 
experiences of the economy are not so far apart that we are not faced with 
scarcity and having to choose, and with institutionalized relations of 
power and exploitation. Therefore we stated in section 1 that in society, 
the practical economie situation, there is not much understanding for the 
theorectlcal discussions about paradigmatic differences. This practical 
perception also implies that the problem of objectivity in economie science 
cannot be how we can ar must choose between paradigms at hand. If this 
choice were the primary problem, then a cohesion in economie experience 
would in fact be denied, Therefore the problem is rather how we can 
theoretically do this cohesion justice, in other words how we can analyze 
various economic-social phenomena in a theory, without introducing a 
ranking order in advance. So the point is not to find a methad by which we 
can make a rational choice between the paradigms, but to relativize the 
sharp dividing. The present article is not the place to solve the stated 
problem, But we can in conclusion say something about the cause of the 
discussed variety of paradigms and thereby something about the direction in 
which a solution might be sought. When discussing Marxist and 
institutionalist economics we saw that a step was made from experience in 
the subjective perspective to a thearetical conceptualization in the 
objective perspective. This conceptualization is in part led by the scheme 
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of explanation functioning in the objective perspective. The remarkable 
thing is now that in spite of all differences as regards content among the 
streams of thought mentioned, the structure of the schemes of explanation 
is the same and this also holds true for the neoclassical economics. This 
structure implies that the economie process is explained or justified in 
terms of a non-economic process behind it. This process lying behind or 
deeper determines the laws and the cohesion in the economy. When we briefly 
typify the three streams of thought in this respect, then the underlying 
process for neoclassical economics is the subjective, psychic utility 
experience of individuals or, if that is too psychologistical, the rational 
action itself, For Marxist economics it is the development of productive 
forces, unstoppable throughout history and for institutionalist economics, 
related to Marxism, it is the evolutionary development af technology. 
At the point of the outlooks on the underlying process the various streams 
of thought fundamentally differ from one another. The cause of this is the 
structure of the explanation schente. This scheme forces us at the chosen 
entrance into the economie process to inquire about a non-economic 
underlying process at the same time. These underlying processes da nat 
necessarily have to show with respect to one another a homogenity by which 
they are mutually combinable. Along this road one can think of even more 
paradigms in economics. Would it therefore not rather be commendable to 
revise the structure of the current explanation scheme and inquire about 
the farces which belang to the economie process? 
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